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Globalization, Losers and Property Rights
Paul B. Thompson*
Jim Chen's stimulating essay "Globalization and Its Losers"
should provoke many comments. I will briefly note a theoretical
objection to his general approach and will then explore the im-
plications of his position for the future of world agriculture. I do
not question the economic logic of the "free trade" view. I agree
that a more globalized market generally allows more efficient
use of natural capital-sunshine, water, genetic diversity, fertile
soils and the like. So-called free trade can be justified by two
distinct and complementary rationales. First, by increasing effi-
cient use of resources, it increases total wealth. Second, an arbi-
trary interference in an individual's right to exchange property
with willing traders is contrary to the most basic principles of
liberty.1
However, many free-traders presume that the doctrine stip-
ulates one way of defining property rights and market structure,
rather than another. They treat their favored conception of prop-
erty rights as if it were a "natural" given, or at least inarguably
correct. Generally, it tends to reflect the prevailing conception of
property in each analysts' own domestic economy. In contrast,
sophisticated economic, legal and philosophical analysis of prop-
erty suggests that rights to access, use, and trade in or profit
from private property represent a complex bundle of rights.
Many different ways of composing the bundle are compatible
with capitalism and free trade. The particular bundle adopted
by any national state will reflect, in some combination, the polit-
ical consensus on when property claims are legitimate (which
subsidiary rights should be included in the bundle), the evolu-
tionary history of the domestic legal system, and the distribu-
tion of market and political power, both at present and
throughout the society's history. 2
Clearly, one may argue that another society has reached su-
perior institutions with respect to the twin goals of increased ef-
ficiency and maximizing personal liberty. In practical terms,
* Professor of Philosophy, Purdue University.
1. Paul B. Thompson, Ethical Issues for International Trade Standards,
CAHIERS D'ECONOMIE ET SOCIOLOGIE RURALES (forthcoming).
2. See generally RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUA-
SION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994); AL-
LAN A. SCHMID, PROPERTY, POWER AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1987).
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this means that one would support "harmonization" that moves
in the direction of another society's property institutions, rather
than one's own. This in no way contradicts the central claim of
free-trade doctrine as it has been handed down from Smith and
Ricardo. However, that doctrine rests on the assumption that
goods being exchanged across international borders are
equivalent to goods being exchanged in the domestic economy. It
is a reasonable assumption in many circumstances, and espe-
cially with respect to trade in commodities where contractual ob-
ligations can be satisfied by any sample consistent with grades
and standards. Cereal grains are generally a paradigm example
of the commodity form, but many other foods (think of French
wines, for example) resist the commodity form by reflecting the
product's provenance in its market identity and exchange value.
Many "free-trade" theorists also presume that one society's
institutions (usually the U.S.) will become the global standard
for property rights. They wring their hands and assert that peo-
ple just don't see the benefits from global trade, but this simply
begs the question. One may accept the "gains from trade" argu-
ment, yet object to the particular way in which property rights
are being institutionalized in multi-national agreements. We
can illustrate the problem with respect to agriculture by com-
paring a commodity-traders view of grain, meats, fiber and dairy
products with a view that might more fully enable consumers to
freely purchase the products most consistent with their values.
The contrast can be drawn for illustrative purposes by overstat-
ing a real tension between U.S. and European views of what is
and is not appropriate to include in the bundle of property rights
that structure exchange in agricultural products. The reality is
admittedly more complex than the following caricature, for
neither the U.S. nor Europe is monolithic with respect to their
views of commodity trading and consumer choice. Yet the ten-
sion revealed by exaggerating the differences between U.S. and
European thinking is a genuine point of conflict in trade
debates.3
U.S. commodity markets emerged through the development
of railroads, grain terminals, slaughterhouses, and eventually
international bulk shipping facilities. This market structure is
only about 150 years old. Prior to that, farm products were
shipped in the bags or bales that farmers and local buyers had
3. See INCORPORATING SCIENCE, ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY IN DEVELOP-
ING SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Board
on Agriculture and Natural Resources, National Research Council, 2000).
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placed them in. It was possible to correlate quality with the spe-
cific grower, processor or shipper of any agricultural product,
and hence possible to integrate a broad array of value judgments
into a purchase decision. The emergence of railroad grain termi-
nals where one farmer's production would be mixed with that of
many others ended trade in agricultural products that preserve
these characteristics as part of the product's identity. A com-
modity's identity consists entirely in its compliance with grades
and standards administered both by government bodies, such as
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and quasi-private institu-
tions, such as the Chicago Board of Trade. 4
Arguably, the "commodity character" of the U.S. food sys-
tem shapes production practices that favor not only efficiency,
but also those efficient producers with the largest volume of pro-
duction. Subsidy payments, allotments and baselines for various
U.S. Department of Agriculture conservation and other payment
programs are keyed to a producer's historical level of production.
The U.S. Congress has also exhibited a persistent willingness to
"bail out" agriculture with emergency payments when prices fall
below the costs of production. As such, U.S. producers face less
potential for losses from investments that expand production
and increase yields than from limiting expenses or shifting to
alternative crops and other value-added activities. 5 Chen's use
of evolutionary models is appropriate here. In a market environ-
ment that demands commodities and a policy environment that
rewards large-scale commodity sellers, large farms survive the
risks of insolvency at a rate that exceeds that of small farms. 6
However, evolutionary rhetoric may conceal what is contentious
about this trend, namely that the market structure and incen-
tives are an artifact created by government, not natural or un-
changeable characteristics of an ecological niche.7
An agriculture which has evolved according to these param-
eters tends to treat environmental impact as an external cost,
one that should be incorporated into production decisions only to
the extent that factors such as soil loss or pollution affect farm-
4. WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AN) THE GREAT
WEST (1991).
5. WiLLARD COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
(1979).
6. Luther Tweeten, The economics of small farms, 219 SCIENCE 1037-1041
(1984).
7. See HAROLD F. BREIMYER, FARM POLICY: THIRTEEN ESSAYS (1976);
Corneilia Flora and Jan Flora, Public policy, farm size, and community well-
being in farming-dependent counties of the plains, in AGRICULTURE AND CoMMu-
NITY CHANGE IN THE U.S. (1988).
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ers themselves over the long run. Given this interpretation, the
policy problem is one of altering the production environment so
that pollution and resource depletion costs are internalized, that
is, reflected in the farmer's cost of production. There are many
policy instruments, including but not limited to regulation, for
accomplishing this task. In this view, environmental compli-
ance imposes new costs on producers (costs that had once been
borne by future generations or society as a whole). Those who
are most capable of bearing increased costs (and weathering the
competition as prices settle out) are the winners, and these tend
to be the larger and better-capitalized firms.8
In contrast to the U.S., European agriculture evolved under
somewhat different parameters. Farmers were traditionally
seen as producers of multiple goods. They were thought to be
producing aesthetic, culture and environmental amenities, as
well as food and fiber goods. The regional identity of foods was
considered an essential component of their market value, and
the legal system mediated disputes over terminology and regu-
lated its use. Farms are viewed as the primary habitat for birds
and wildlife, and are expected to reinforce cultural values both
through their appearance and through educational activities
such as "farm stay" vacations. Solidarity has also been sought
through agriculture. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
was viewed as the linchpin of the early Common Market. Re-
cently, Europeans have favored African banana growers as a
form of reparation for abuses of the colonial era. European con-
sumers may now discriminate on the basis of considerations
such as "green," "animal welfare friendly" and "not genetically
modified," none of which are meaningful in a U.S. context.
There are powerful economic incentives for increasing scale,
and many European firms are aggressive participants in global
commodity markets. Nevertheless, relatively smaller farms
have been able to prosper in Europe partly because Europeans
are willing to compensate their farmers for producing amenities
such as cultural heritage and perceived environmental quality.
This is done partly by subsidy and tax policy, but also through
market structures that give European consumers confidence
that their food expenditures are also purchasing a humane, cul-
turally rich and becoming rural environment. The European
market structure for wines or cheeses is a particularly apt exam-
ple of bundling regional and cultural identity into food products.
In the U.S., by contrast, anyone can market their sparkling wine
8. See A. RANDALL, RESOURCE ECONOMICS (1981).
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as "champagne" or their cheese as "cheddar." Europeans have
expressed their willingness to pay for the cultural amenities of
regional foods through their support for policies that structure
markets so that regionally produced goods may be reliably
obtained.9
It is not clear to me that either approach is a clear-cut win-
ner over the other. On the one hand, trade in commodities
places barriers on freedom to trade in complex bundled goods-
one cannot "buy" reparation at the same time one buys bananas,
for example. On the other hand, the provenance (or identity-
preserved) view places barriers to trade in least-cost raw com-
modities. Each view seems to have evolved in response to differ-
ent political and technological histories, and each has
weaknesses as well as strengths. For example, Europeans seem
more likely to impose questionable values on others. They may
be doing this in rejecting products from developing countries
without child labor laws. Yet if there are no public schools, chil-
dren are arguably better off at work than on the street. An out-
right prohibition of child labor may be a moral imperative in the
industrialized democracies of Europe and North America, but
that fact does not justify universal application of that impera-
tive, especially in countries where institutions of family work
and childcare are quite different. On the other hand, the Euro-
pean style seems more democratic in two senses. First, more
people are able to express a broader array of values in making
their consumption decisions. Second, the procedure for estab-
lishing a provenance brings the multiple functions of agriculture
before the public eye, and makes them subject of public debate.
Having a debate about which elements to include or exclude
from the bundle of values that consumers purchase may produce
more durable consumer "buy in" for market policies. In contrast,
few Americans play any discernable role in the establishment of
commodity trading rules. That may make the American style
both more elitist and more fragile. Any fair comparison would
necessarily continue at some length.
Like many economic analysts, Chen appears to presume
that what I have characterized as a U.S. market structure is
"natural" or perhaps an instance of emergent order. If the lat-
ter, it is an order that emerged in an environment highly struc-
tured by law, policy and publicly funded agricultural research.
9. This is not to say that European agriculture is necessarily more sus-
tainable or environmentally sound than U.S. agriculture. Comparative figures
are not readily available.
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Chen's analysis simply assumes the illegitimacy of any attempt
to purchase environmental, cultural or social amenities by struc-
turing markets so that these goods would be in the bundle of
property rights exchanged in farm produce transactions. No ar-
gument for his view is forthcoming. Comparative advantage
does not do it, for comparative advantage assumes that the char-
acteristics of goods produced in different places are equivalent.
And it is precisely the equivalence of these goods that is at issue
in comparing alternative systems of property rights. Trade
economists often say that overtly cynical protectionists promote
the forms of product differentiation discussed above solely on the
basis of self-interest. This would only be an argument against
provenance if we could be sure that cynical commodity produ-
cers (and commodity traders) do not promote commodity-ori-
ented policies on the basis of their self-interest. But this seems
very unlikely. Any rationale can and will be expropriated by
those whose interests happen to be advanced by it. The issue is
whether independent conceptions of fairness, economic democ-
racy and the public good support one way of configuring market
structure over others.
Globalization does not, in itself, entail either approach to
the definition of property rights. The computer industry, for ex-
ample, has globalized by finding ways to tailor both hardware
and software products to the needs and demands of local con-
sumers, resisting the commodity form. The industry has in-
vested in developing technology that balances the need for
standardization with diverse consumer needs. Where privacy is
a substantial concern, software and public policies have been de-
veloped to accommodate it without mandating industry wide
uniformity. 10 In agriculture, U.S. commodity producers have
tried to use GATT and now the WTO to require other countries
to accept food products that, while meeting food safety stan-
dards, cannot be certified with respect to origin or method of pro-
duction, and that preclude quality discriminations that cannot
be verified by risk assessments of impact on human health or on
the environment of the importing nation."- We cannot begin to
debate the substantive issues until we see that the priority
given to the U.S. commodity configuration of property rights
rests on assumptions that themselves stand in need of defense.
It then becomes possible to ask whether U.S. market structure
is preferable because of low food prices, for example, or whether
10. BiLL GATES, THE RoAD AHEA4D (1995).
11. Supra note 3.
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European market structure is preferable because it supports
traditional, family-style farms.
Asking this question, it becomes possible to ask why family
farms are worth preserving in the first place. The answer to
that question may suggest that there is something like an agra-
rian meme, to follow Chen's metaphor, and that it would be pru-
dent to ponder its elimination from the meme pool before
deciding unequivocally for the commodity-production view of ag-
riculture. Political theorists dating back to antiquity have ar-
gued that the loyalty of agricultural producers is crucial to the
success of any regime. Manufacturers and traders may relocate
when times are tough, but the farmer's reliance on land (an as-
set that cannot be moved from place to place) creates a some-
what permanent interest in the stability and security of the
state. A given plot of land is irrevocably tied to the territorial
state in which it happens to be located. This gives farmers an
interest in the politics and defense of the state, as it limits their
ability to relocate their assets when political winds change. 12
Agrarian political theory makes many contestable claims,
and it has been asserted in defense of some unsavory political
movements. In my view, the most plausible reading of classical
agrarianism is that farm population is most crucial during the
early stages of state formation. Governments are prudent to
protect the interests of landowners, be they a small hereditary
elite, as in the 18' century English House of Lords, or diverse
and widely dispersed yeomen, as in Jefferson's America. Those
who derive their wealth from farming have interests more
closely tied to the fortunes of the territorial state than others.
Favoring landed interests also favors democracy when land
holdings are widely distributed. As such, there are reasons to
resist actions that concentrate land holdings, or that skew eco-
nomic development toward wealth that is vulnerable to capital
flight, at least during the early stages of state formation. Classi-
cal agrarian claims are less plausible in states where democratic
institutions have taken root and where relatively few people
participate in food production.' 3
If globalization were occurring in a world of states with
well-established democratic institutions, the agrarian meme
might have little function (at least in its classical formulation).
But corruption and capital flight are serious problems in many
12. See V. HANSON, THE OTHER GREEKS: THE FAMY FARM AND THE AGRA-
RLAN ROOTS OF WESTERN CnLizATION (1995).
13. P. B. Thompson, AGRICULTuRAL ETmcs (1998).
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countries today. Perhaps agrarian political theory is not as
quaint as liberal theorists of developed economies believe. Yet,
there is more. Beyond its relevance to state formation, agrarian
thought has always insisted on a multi-functional interpretation
of agricultural production. Properly structured, agriculture is
alleged to promote citizenship, democracy, community solidarity
and stewardship, as well as bringing forth the goods needed for
human sustenance. A neo-agrarian might add wildlife habitat,
rural aesthetics and cultural identity to that list, while perhaps
subtracting some of the claims that stress farmers' superior
moral character. The point of a neo-agrarian view is to question
whether policies that optimize only one of agriculture's functions
(the production of commodities) capture everything we want
from agriculture.
The neo-agrarian view might be more accurately described
as multi-functional agriculture. It might be summarized as fol-
lows: agriculture is "special" (it differs from other sectors of the
economy) because of the way in which environmental impact
and sense of community are so intimately related to the means
of production. Rather than seeing social and environmental im-
pacts as externalities from farm production, we should see them
as co-products. Since one cannot optimize two or more variables
simultaneously, we should not presume that multifunctional ag-
ricultural production function can be optimized with respect to
all of its co-products. We thus need a new approach to the evalu-
ation of economic performance in the agricultural sector. For
the time being, it is reasonable to keep our options open, and to
resist the temptation to eliminate the agrarian meme from our
cultural meme pool.
The commodity view treats agriculture as but one sector of
an industrial economy among many. Each sector is expected to
pursue efficient transformation of capital, labor and material in-
puts into salable products. Where markets fail to provide incen-
tives for reflecting the costs of pollution, resource depletion or
other environmental impacts, government intervention may be
warranted. But the producer may remain intent on a one-di-
mensional approach to efficiency until these costs are internal-
ized. I do not believe that what I have said here is sufficient to
defeat the industrial-sector view of agriculture, or to defend a
neo-agrarian view. But it would be unfortunate if the indus-
trial-sector view of agriculture wins out just because trade theo-
rists lack the imagination to ponder an alternative.
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